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effective representation, social programs have been cancelled at will and economic 
policies and reforms are implemented without debate with those they most affect.   
    With this last wave of democratization, the indigenous people of Ecuador are 
now highly organized.  They have changed their image from one of subservience to the 
traditional political and economic elites to one of activists demanding the government 
uphold its constitutional mandate while increasing the indigenous peoples own rights to 
self-determination.  The combination of these three factors creates potential for further 
violence.  The governments pursuit of oil- led development and its damaging effects on 
the economy and environment will clash with the indigenous peoples desire to maintain 
their culture and way of life.  The violence stemming from the insurgency and large flows 
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Although not as well known as the other, larger countries in South America, 
Ecuador has in recent years been overcome with large, nation-wide protests and a 
momentary coup, without a change in its democratic form of government.  This country 
is a microcosm of the many problems inherent within Latin America.  Only 40 percent of 
Ecuadorian citizens stated that they prefer democracy to any other kind of government.  
This is down from a high of 57 percent in 1998.  Dissatisfaction is also on the rise with 
approximately 65 percent responding "not very satisfied" plus "not at all satisfied" in 
1996 jumping around 10 percentage points to the order of 75 percent in 2001.  Perhaps 
most importantly is the economy that has potential, but continuing debt problems and 20 
years of stabilization and adjustment polices has produced a per capita income of $1,200, 
one the lowest in the Americas.  1998-99 GDP per capita averaged a real growth of 
negative 9 percent.  For 1999 to 2000 that figure is 0.4 percent.  As Ecuador's leading 
trading partner, the current U.S. economic slow down will cause a drop off in exports.  
Coupled with continuing difficulties in Argentina, this economic downturn will cause 
increased hardship for Ecuador’s indigenous people. 
Severe poverty and discrimination of the indigenous people are urgent problems 
that have the potential to generate political violence.  The leadership of Ecuador’s 
indigenous movements could, at some point, resort to violent words of incitement.  In 
using the work of Paul Wilkinson on terrorism, "leaders of avowedly non-violent 
movements have found it difficult to contain and control the effects of emotive 
propaganda," and further research shows "others freely resort to such means to incite and 
intensify hatred and to encourage physical violence."  Since the transition from military 
rule, non-violent modes of political argument, ranging from political dissent and 
disagreement, informal and formalized opposition, to electoral competition, lobbying, 
protest and demonstration, conscientious objection and civil disobedience, have all been 
used by Ecuador’s indigenous peoples.  They have attempted to and continue to work 
with the system at hand, electing a few representatives to congress.  However, this has 
produced few benefits for them. 
 x 
I have argued that Ecuador has historically excluded the indigenous peoples 
economically to the point where they exist at the lowest levels of poverty in the country.  
Historically the indigenous people have been tied to their land and current economic 
policies are endangering their communal property rights and their way of life.  Also 
contributing to that inequality is the political exclusion they experience.  Without 
effective representation, social programs may be cancelled at will and economic policies 
and reforms are implemented without debate with those they most affect.  With this last 
wave of democratization, the indigenous people are now highly organized.  They have 
changed their image from one of subservience to activists demanding the government 
uphold its constitutional mandate while increasing the indigenous peoples own rights to 
self-determination.  The combination of these three factors creates potential for further 
violence.  The governments pursuit of oil and its damaging effects on the economy and 
environment will clash with the indigenous peoples desire to maintain their culture and 
way of life.  The violence stemming from the insurgency and large flows of illegal money 





























A.  DESCRIPTION 
Throughout Latin America government policies have been failing to create very 
much support for democratic governments that have come to power.  A Chilean 
organization, Latinobarometro has been conducting a regional opinion poll for the past 
six years.  This survey is one means of determining at a glance the level of support 
democracy has among the countries of Latin America.  The poll taken by 
Latinobarometro in 2001 reflects that there may be a crisis of democracy as citizens 
become disillusioned, leading to a fall in support for democracy throughout this region.  
The reasons cited are few, but key in the eyes of the populace are such items as 
dissatisfaction "with the way democracy is operating in practice" and the rapid rise in 
crime and drug addiction. 1  Even distrust of fellow citizens has risen along with the 
impression that corruption has gone from appalling to shocking.  It seems that democracy 
has not proven itself as confidence in the armed forces among the Latin Americans polled 
is greater than that of the institution of president, or the national congress, or political 
parties.2   
Closely tied to the falling support for democracy is the problem of weak 
economies throughout Latin America.  Many people of the region associate the economy 
with the regime in power.3  For many years the majority of enterprises were state owned 
throughout the region.  Import substitution industrialization policies demanded protection 
and direction from the state.  Military regimes had taken power on the pretense of 
protecting the economy.  As this idea is pervasive it can easily erode democracy's 
legitimacy as economic conditions worsen. 4  The connection is obvious when many 
countries adopt economic reform emphasizing the privatization of national industries, 
                                                 
1 The Economist. "An alarm call for Latin America's democrats" July 28th-August 3rd, 2001.  Vol. 
360 Number 8232.  37. 
2 Ibid, 38.   
3 Diamond, Larry, et al., Democracy in Developing Countries Latin America.  2nd ed. Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., Boulder. 1999. 46.   
4 Ibid.  
2 
lessening or abolishment of market restrictions, and industrial technological advancement 
focusing on the those products that are exportable.  In the region as a whole the renewed 
economic weakness has led to a "modest rise in the numbers of those who favor 
dictatorship."5   Many Latin countries faced down turns in 1995, 1998-99 and now in 
2001 continue too perform with disappointing results.  The economic slump in the United 
States is sure to have grave implications for many of the economies throughout the 
Americas. 6  Ties to the U.S. have grown in the past twenty years thanks in part to 
globalization.  Adding to the misery, the largest trading bloc of South America, 
MERCOSUR can be termed a "phony customs union" as "almost none of the 
"deepening" associated with a customs union has happened" and "is steadily moving 
away from, not towards, common tariffs."7  What was supposed to contribute to opening 
of economies and export- led growth is now creating stagnation.   
Poor economies and badly implemented reforms have dramatic impacts on the 
poorer sectors.8  However, indigenous peoples get a double dose of negative effects.  Not 
only do they make up the largest portion of destitute in society, they are also the most 
politically excluded citizens of Latin America.  In 1995 the Minorities at Risk Project 
identified 17 countries from the Western Hemisphere with 30 minority groups at risk.  
Put together this is a population of approximately 112,320,000.9  Since the arrival of the 
Spanish conquistador, the indigenous peoples of Latin America have had to struggle to 
survive.  In the 20th century nation building, consolidation and expanding state power 
has typically taken the path of subordinating the "interests and relative autonomy of 
ethnic groups to state elites' conception of national identity and interest."10  Invariably 
this means that indigenous peoples are subordinated with their labor and resources 
                                                 
5  The Economist. "An alarm call for Latin America's democrats" July 28th-August 3rd, 2001.  Vol. 
360 Number 8232.  37. 
6 The Economist. "Breaking barriers in the Americas" April 21st-27th, 2001. Vol. 359 Number 8218. 
14.   
7 The Economist. "Some realism for Mercosur" March 31st-April 6th, 2001. Vol. 358 Number 8215.  
18.   
8  Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 1995. 318.  
9 Crocker, Chester A. et al. Sources of and Responses to International Conflict.  United States Institute 
of Peace Press, Washington, DC. 1996.  55 
10 Ibid, 62.   
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extracted solely for the benefit of the state.  Indigenous discontent has in the past led to 
physical violence in Uruguay, Nicaragua, and most recently in Mexico.   
Although not as well known as the other, larger countries in South America, 
Ecuador has in recent years been overcome with large, nation-wide protests and a 
momentary coup, without a change in its democratic form of government.  This country 
is a microcosm of the many problems inherent within Latin America.  Only 40 percent of 
Ecuadorian citizens stated that they prefer democracy to any other kind of government.  
This is down from a high of 57 percent in 1998.  Dissatisfaction is also on the rise with 
approximately 65 percent responding "not very satisfied" plus "not at all satisfied" in 
1996 jumping around 10 percentage points to the order of 75 percent in 2001.11  Perhaps 
most importantly is the economy that has potential, but continuing debt problems and 20 
years of stabilization and adjustment polices has produced a per capita income of $1,200, 
one the lowest in the Americas.12  1998-99 GDP per capita averaged a real growth of 
negative 9 percent.  For 1999 to 2000 that figure is 0.4 percent.13  As Ecuador's leading 
trading partner, the current U.S. economic slow down will cause a drop off in exports.  
Coupled with continuing difficulties in Argentina and it impact throughout South 
America, Ecuador's third largest trading area overall, will cause increased hardship on 
those people.   
Of the total Ecuadorian population, 45 percent is of indigenous descent.  In this 
population of around 5.4 million, most are said to live in conditions of extreme poverty. 14  
Continuing difficulty with the institutions of Ecuador and their political and economic 
exclusion has created discontent among the indigenous.  This discontent with democracy 
and the economy resulted in the January 21st 2000 coup.  With the support of 10,000 
protesters, predominately indigenous, united with the local military they set about to 
overthrow the government.  They established a new regime, but were quickly forestalled 
                                                 
11 The Economist. "An alarm call for Latin America's democrats" July 28th-August 3rd, 2001.  Vol. 
360 Number 8232.  37.   
12 Sullivan, Mark P.,  "Ecuador: Political/Economic Conditions and US Relations"  Foreign Affairs 
and National Defense Division, CRS Report for Congress. 1996  
13 World Bank. 2001 World Development Indicators database.  http://www.worldbank.org  Accessed 
10/9/01.   
14 Chalmers, Douglas A.  et al The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America. Oxford University 
Press. New York. 1997.  171.  
4 
by actions of the higher military leadership within the day.  Negotiation resulted in the 
vice-president being elevated to the head of the elected government.15  When faced with 
a situation that the indigenous felt was to their disadvantage, dollarization and adjustment 
policies, they were willing to step outside lawful boundaries and the democratic process 
to accomplish their goals.     
Although Ecuadorians have espoused the ideals of liberal economics, recent 
administrations have had only limited success in carrying out structural reforms that 
could promote investment and economic growth.  Some degree of progress has been 
made on budget reform, reduction of public employment levels, and elimination of some 
unnecessary and market distorting regulations.  In most cases implementation has lagged 
behind legislation due to a high degree of dependence on the state.  In April 2001, Leo 
Goldstein, economist at Salomon Smith Barney, reported that Ecuador needs IMF 
support to avoid defaulting on its sovereign debt within 18 months.  A default could send 
ripple effects throughout Latin America.  Structural reforms could also cause large 
sectors of the population to become disaffected due to austerity measures.  The resulting 
fall in expectations may cause some to seek any means in order to maintain some 
standard of living. 
Among severe poverty, under privilege and discrimination the indigenous people 
are contending with the most desperately urgent problems.  The leadership could, at some 
point, resort to violent words of incitement.  In using the work of Paul Wilkinson on 
terrorism, "leaders of avowedly non-violent movements have found it difficult to contain 
and control the effects of emotive propaganda," and further research shows "others freely 
resort to such means to incite and intensify hatred and to encourage physical violence."16  
Since the transition from military rule, non-violent modes of political argument: ranging 
from political dissent and disagreement, informal and formalized opposition, to electoral 
competition, lobbying, protest and demonstration, conscientious objection and civil 
disobedience have all been, and are in continual use by the Ecuadorian people.  They 
have attempted to and continue to work with the system at hand, electing a few 
                                                 
15 Workers World. "U.S. engineers coup against people's gov't"  February 3, 2000.  
http://www.workers.org/ww/2000/ecuador0203.html.  Accessed 6/1/01. 
16 Wilkinson, Paul.  Terrorism and the Liberal State. 2ed. New York Press, New York. 1986. 23.   
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representatives to congress.  The true accomplishment of democracy is the willingness of 
the entire societal array to consent to the final decisions of the governing bodies as 
authoritative and obligatory for all.  This structure fails when a vocal majority, or 
minority group in the society will not agree to, or abide by an unpopular law or policy 
selected by the regime.17 
The indigenous organizations have accomplished much in recent years with the 
election to Parliament of 8 indigenous representatives, but as with all other areas they are 
a minority and experience difficulty in promoting their agenda.18  Since the transition 
from military rule in 1979, the opportunity for political participation should have been 
higher as the constitution expanded the franchise to include many previously excluded 
indigenous voters.  However, the state's inability to penetrate into the rural areas, and 
years of being marginalized at the hands of the government has made them suspicious 
and unwilling to participate.  Their most effective means of political action has been mass 
demonstrations and strikes to force negotiate with the government, often accompanied by 
violence.  The promise of trade liberalization and privatization has raised expectations 
among the population, which have not been met.  Additionally, oil production has 
brought revenue to the state, yet little to nothing has been returned to the petroleum 
regions of rural indigenous people.  In fact oil has damaged indigenous land and 
communities.  This thesis will attempt to answer one simple question.  What is the 
likelihood of the indigenous population to resort to violence against the Ecuadorian state?  
This question can be broken down into two parts: What incentives do ind igenous groups 
have to take up arms?  What ability do they have to sustain an armed struggle?     
Given the political environment in Ecuador and the problems of an economy with 
"Dutch Disease," called such from the crisis natural gas produced in Holland, 19 the 
poverty stricken indigenous people may use the drug trade as a means of funding violent 
movements against the government.  As resources are drawn away from agriculture, the 
traditional activity of the indigenous, they will find themselves financially unsustainable, 
                                                 
17 Ibid, 25 
18 Burke, Pam, "The Lowland (Amazonian) Indians of Ecuador."  1997.  
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/lindecu.htm  Accessed 12/11/2001.   
19 Cardoso, Eliana, and Ann Helwege, Latin America's Economy Diversity, Trends, and Conflicts. The 
MIT Press, Cambridge. 1992. 33.   
6 
as subsistence farming will not support the large numbers of jobless.  This economic 
problem has its base in the export boom of one product, like oil, and the subsequent 
balance-of-payments surplus.  Although revenue is generated during the boom, the 
economy often suffers from rising inflation, declining exports of agriculture and 
manufactures, lower rates of income growth, and rising unemployment.  These results are 
all detrimental to a developing economy. 20   An oil export boom stimulates a rapid 
increase in domestic inflation, which in turn causes the real exchange rate to appreciate.  
The implication is that other exports become less competitive and therefore less 
profitable because importing goods is cheaper.  A producer of tradable goods, both 
exporters and import competitors, will face growing prices for their purchases of non-
tradable goods and services, together with worker wages.  The dilemma is that they 
compete with foreign producers so they cannot channel increased costs to the consumer.  
Both farmers and manufactures will experience a loss of profit and lead some to reduce 
production and employment.  The boom in oil exports and the concurrent prosperity is 
partly counteracted by a deterioration of tradable industries raising discontent with the 
economy among the whole population. 21   
   
B.  IMPORTANCE 
Foremost among the dangers with which the United States should be concerned 
with in Ecuador is the fall of a democratically elected government, thereby creating 
greater instability within the region.  Democracy is the best means of ensuring all groups 
have some voice in government.  This thesis will help us to understand the conditions 
under which a democratic government may suffer civil unrest or come under the threat of 
armed revolt.  These conditions include the type of state or political regime and the 
actions they undertake that will make them be vulnerable as well as which types of 
indigenous are likely to make demands via the use of force.  Since the end of the cold 
war, the U.S. has made the spread and maintenance of democracy one of its main policy 
concerns.   
                                                 
20 Gillis, Malcolm et al, Economics of Development, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. New York, 3rd 
ed. 1992.   434. 
21 Ibid, 436. 
7 
Following on that issue is the large drug trade present within South America.  For 
two decades the U.S. has attempted to cut the flow of cocaine that started in Bolivia and 
Peru, and spread into Colombia and could extend elsewhere.  In Colombia drugs fund 
both the left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries in perpetual violence.22  As an 
ally in the drug war former president Jamil Mahuad signed a 10-year agreement, in 1999, 
to allow the U.S. a Forward Operating Location at an airfield in Manta.  The ability to fly 
surveillance flights from this military field is a boost in the fight against drugs.  Ecuador 
receives no rent from the use of this airfield and only $8 million to deal with the refugees 
that will be generated from Plan Colombia.23  The indigenous have already stated their 
opposition to the U.S. military presence, and a change in government favoring the 
indigenous majority could result in U.S. withdrawal from Ecuador.24   
In the Ecuador-Peru border conflict there have been several hostile incidents, but 
in 1995 after fourteen years of planning, the Ecuadorian military was able to redeem 
itself in a successful campaign in the field against Peru, raising their stature among the 
Ecuadorian people.  The level of planning and execution showed a remarkable amount of 
autonomy from civilian control.  The role the military played instigating the conflict 
suggests that an internal war would lead to increased power or autonomy for the military, 
which already possesses a high level of legitimacy. 25  This would be, in itself, a great 
threat to a fragile democracy but additionally, the military has developed a good rapport 
with the indigenous from rural development programs.  The military is now in a position 
to be an arbiter between the government and the indigenous organizations.  
In the drive for a Free-Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a destabilized 
Ecuador would be one more barrier to liberalizing trade in the Americas.  A free-trade 
area would eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers among the member countries.  With a 
                                                 
22 The Economist. "Breaking barriers in the Americas" April 21st-27th 2001, vol. 359, number 8218. 
14.    
23 The Economist.  "Collateral damage" February 3 rd-9th 2001, vol 358, number 8207. 40.   
24 Stratfor.com's Global Intelligence Update, "Ecuador: Seeking the Benefits of a Plan Colombia, 24 
October 2000.   http://www.stratfor.com  Accessed 10/24/2000. 
25 Palmer, David Scott, "Peru-Ecuador border Conflict: Missed Opportunities, Misplaced Nationalism, 
and Multilateral Peacekeeping," Journal of Inter-American Studies & World Affairs .  Vol 39, Number 3 
Fall 1997.  114. 
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goal date of 2006, any set back could lead to a longer wait.  The U.S. is Ecuador's largest 
export market, as well as one of the single largest import markets.  A strain on the 
Ecuadorian government from civil unrest or outright rebellion might damage the political 
dialog established from the Summit of the Americas.  Many leaders in Latin America are 
still suspicious of the U.S. as the sole superpower.  Tensions based on this asymmetric 
relationship go to the beginnings of independence.  The benefits from free trade are well 
known, despite the problems adjustment will cause, a free-trade area would be 
characterized by minimal cooperation and integration.  Fears of a destabilizing Latin 
America will make the fight for FTAA more difficult to achieve with the U.S. Congress.   
 
C.  METHODOLOGY  
The topic of this thesis will be violent resistance against the government by the 
Ecuadorian indigenous people.  Using a case study methodology I will use background 
knowledge to construct statements concerning the potential of the indigenous.  In this 
manner it may be possible to determine one possible future for Ecuador.  There have been 
many arguments as to under what conditions marginalized citizens will resort to political 
violence.  Ecuador is the prototypical case of a weak regime that continues to survive.  
Other countries face the same problems of economic and political exclusion among its 
population, but what makes Ecuador interesting is now the added problem of an 
organized, indigenous population disgruntled with the status quo, and has demonstrated a 
willingness to force change.  The research for this project will come from an assortment 
of secondary sources.  Relevant books, academic periodicals, Internet resources, and 
conference papers will be used as research sources to gain a better understanding of past 
and current events within the country.   
 
D.  ORGANIZATION 
The introduction has provided information on recent events in Ecuador, and U.S. 
interests in both Ecuador and South American, as well as the desire for stability in the 
region.  Many issues are briefly mentioned, however the intent of this short introduction 
will serve to show how one spark may at any time ignite political violence within the 
9 
country.  Within chapter 2 an attempt is made to gage the growth and scope of the oil 
industry and the negative externalities associated with petroleum as the primary product 
of production, continuing the economic exclusion of the indigenous.  Within chapter 3 
the stagnant political picture will be discussed and why there is an inability to provide 
effective representation.  Indigenous political exclusion has resulted from the division 
between the landed elite of the inland region and the power of the coastal region that 
creates a fractured party system.  It will provide information on presidential powers and 
how most issues are dealt with by decree.  Also included is the new constitution, which 
has purposely weakened the powers of the judiciary and congress with the president as 
the beneficiary.  The final thoughts will be the political process and its inability to be an 
effective means of participation in the decision making process.  Chapter 4 will then 
focus on the indigenous populations, which have risen in the past to cause the overthrow 
of a democratically elected president.  I will argue that the combination of factors of a 
weak state, economic exclusion, and a mobilized population can eventually lead to 
political violence.  It will look at the leadership and goals of the indigenous organizations 
stemming from their ideology.  The status of the indigenous populations, and how they 
view themselves culturally as a nation is at odds with the concept of the nation-state.  In 
ending this chapter it can be seen how in the past decade the indigenous people have been 
growing in strength as a force for change outside the accepted political process.  In the 
conclusion a recap of the previous chapters will be made and the prospects for 
negotiation and change leading to growth, equitable development and the maintenance of 
peace will be covered.  Recommendations to both the U.S. and Ecuadorian governments 
will be put forward.  A stable Ecuadorian government can have positive effects on U.S. 
security interests.  Ecuador, with greater legitimacy stemming from a deepening of 
democracy will be able to redress some of the inequities of the past.  
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II. ECUADORIAN ECONOMY  
A structural argument would state that a capitalist driven economy would 
eventually be at odds with a democratic form of governance as the demands of the people 
outstrip the growth of the economy and the regimes ability to accommodate change.  The 
likely answer is the regime's choices in determining reforms and policy actions are not in 
response to societal demands, thus creating crisis.26  What this chapter will show is the 
government choices concerning development are shaping a situation where the desires of 
a few elite for growth will clash with the desires of the indigenous people.  In the past the 
economy has left the indigenous groups out.  Land shortages, colonization and 
government policies are creating economic and social pressures on these communities.  
The lack of competitive industrial capability and the single minded race for oil is 
repeating a cycle of boom and bust whereby they will not have the capability in the long 
run to accommodate the demands of indigenous peoples.  The indigenous predominate in 
the Sierra and the Amazon, and their existence is marked by consistent economic 
exclusion.   
 
A.  HISTORICAL CONTEXT    
The Indian way of life is based on agricultural work.  In the Sierra large 
landholding place a premium on cultivable land.  An Indian may be found working for a 
large estate, own a small plot, or is a member of a collective.27  Until the discovery of oil 
in the 1970's, Ecuador was just an agrarian economy and was reliant on the export of 
primary products.   Indigenous could be cheaply employed in this sector and were easily 
exploited, as they were uneducated and lacked skills.  Success of the economy was 
coupled to rising world prices for coastal goods, such as cacao and bananas.  In 1972, oil 
expansion in the Amazon basin resulted in a decade of quick growth, averaging 9 percent 
annually.  This boom resulted in spreading public services, increasing the number of state 
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enterprises, improving infrastructure, and most importantly continuing the ISI strategy. 28  
This strategy pulls resources away from the agricultural sector and puts it into industrial 
development.  Inevitably the oil prices began to fall in the early 1980’s, and Ecuador 
chose not to shrink unproductive state participation in the economy.  As a result the 
1980's were a decade of economic reversal as the burdens of debt, price increases, 
deficient adjustment measures, and unpredictable global oil prices made growth 
impossible and many indigenous social programs the first to be canceled.29   
The state has been the primary actor in the economy, however some transfers 
occurred where many areas of it are now owned and operated by private concerns.  
Improving state efficiency means the indigenous are relegated to economic servitude as 
the only jobs available are in the informal economy.  Despite this level of privatization, 
bureaucratic regulation, unproductive subsidies, and state ownership of "strategic" 
economic assets remains the preferred management style.  In the 1990-95 period Ecuador 
completed 9 privatization transactions.  This garnered $96 million in revenue but 
accounted for only 0.13 percent of GDP.30  The central government uses around 29.8 
percent of GDP to sustain the public sector with the formal sector work force supplying 
approximately one fourth of labor requirements.  As the 20th century came to a close, 
tentative actions had been taken toward minimizing the state’s role as the main player and 
controller of the economy, while intensifying its capacity to successfully fund desired 
social services and execute economic regulations.31 
Entering into the 1990's, Ecuador started to formulate market-oriented structural 
reforms, but the partial execution of these measures has proven unsuccessful at creating 
sustainable growth causing the program to be scraped despite a Standby Agreement with 
the IMF.32  Excluded from the decision-making process and the worst to suffer from the 
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effects, the indigenous followed with the first of many protests.  Making matters worse, 
plummeting oil prices, damage caused by an El Niño storm, and the international 
financial catastrophe in the late 1990’s additionally hindered economic development.  
Petroleum production and agricultural exports are all that the government can depended 
upon to maintain solvency.  The petroleum sector is mainly state-operated and generates 
about 50 percent of public sector revenue, 36 percent of export earnings, and has the 
capability of ensuring a favorable trade balance.  Major new venture capital in the sector 
has not been forthcoming owing to delays from indigenous objections to adding to the 
existing oil pipeline and constructing a follow on pipeline across the Andes thru native 
territory.33  Complicating the issue is the government's corruption and the practice of 
ignoring provisions with non-state owned companies holding legal contracts.  The 
government hopes to boost the tourism industry and diversify revenue in this manner 
based on the success achieved with the Galapagos Islands and expanding from there.34  
However, this does not address the advantages export diversification can provide for the 
economy.   
Focusing more closely on the economic history is an article written by Joan B. 
Anderson on Ecuador, which is a lengthy study of the country's political economy since 
1950 to 1992.  The primary finding of this article could characterize many Latin 
American countries.  They all have been or continue to be dominated by highly unequal 
income distribution and a dependence on the export of primary goods. 35   This has 
certainly been the case for Ecuador since independence.  Of significance is the creation of 
a middle class during the state- led attempt at industrialization utilizing the ISI model.  
The nature of industrial work presupposes an education and literacy in order to build 
skills.  Therefore indigenous participation was and continues to be small.  The failure of 
this program can be seen in the continued reliance on primary products for export 
earnings, and the larger, rural majority of the population carrying the brunt of poverty.  
Market reforms were undertaken in the 1980's, but Anderson feels that market forces will 
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be insufficient by themselves to create growth and equity.  Improvements in education, 
health and literacy have occurred with the advent of the boom periods, however she 
characterizes the country "with an overdeve loped bureaucracy and overprotected, 
monopolized industry, both working to maintain the wealth and power of the upper 
classes" and a declining potential for future development.36   
As the ISI strategy was unsuccessful in transforming the Ecuadorian economy,  
industry is largely oriented to servicing the domestic market, but due to the shift in 
economic policy to export oriented growth, is slowly becoming more export oriented.37  
Export oriented growth threatens the indigenous people as they are primarily subsistence 
farmers.  Incentives would only go to those who specifically designed their farms for 
large-scale production in single products for export.  When Febres Cordero took office in 
1984, he did what many other Latin American countries in following years would do, and 
transitioned to a free market economy.  The exchange rate was devalued and many state 
regulations and controls eliminated.  He opened up oil exploration to foreign corporations 
and created incentives to draw private capital into Ecuador.38  Competition was allowed 
in the economy by cutting tariffs and quotas on a large number of manufactured goods.   
The loss of protection for local manufacturers and rising interest rates caused production 
to slowdown and unemployment to rise leading to strikes in 1986 and 1987.  A major 
earthquake in 1987 dealt a major blow to the economy by rupturing the oil pipeline, and 
interrupting the export of oil on which Ecuador had become so dependent.  All debt 
service payments were suspended until the country could recover from these disasters.  
Inflation began to rise and income distribution became increasingly uneven impacting the 
indigenous worst of all.39   
In 1994, the macroeconomic program in place resulted in a balanced budget and a 
fall in the inflation rate.  However, several shocks in the mid to late 1990's led to a stall in 
the economic reform program.  Falling oil prices, and coastal devastation from El Nino 
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distracted the government which was not up to the task, and failed to privatize the state 
owned telephone company, reduce the inflation rate, or improve the electricity generation 
segment of the economy.  The administration of Jamil Mahuad inherited major economic 
problems and was wracked by a persistent fiscal budget deficit, a poorly managed 
banking system, a currency continually being devalued, inflation, and negative economic 
growth.  Debt service accounts for close to 41 percent of central government 
expenditures.  The country can be viewed as suffering from "Dutch disease" and remains 
highly dependent on oil revenue and customs charges.40  The effect on the indigenous 
peoples is poor long-term funding for the Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization 
(IERAC).  Designed to reduce unequal land distribution, it is one of the first programs to 
suffer during economic crisis and the last to be funded.  Its poor performance is reflected 
in its creation of many land disputes and human rights abuses of indigenous peoples.41  
 
B.  THE DRIVE FOR OIL 
While the indigenous might in some instances be recognized to hold title to land, 
under the constitution, all subsurface resources are property of the state.  Therefore the 
government feels justified in ignoring indigenous claims.  Petroleum is the basis for 
Ecuador’s external economy, with average production of 236,000 barrels per day 
accounting for 12 percent of GDP.   Exports of 85 million barrels of crude and 13.7 
million barrels of refined products earned $1.5 billion, up from $924.2 million in 1998. 
The price of Ecuadorian crude averaged $15.50 in 1999. As of July 2000, it was close to 
$26.3 per barrel. Although the government technically allows the free retail pricing of 
gasoline, wholesale margin controls effectively set the pump price.  Three quarters of 
crude production comes from fields in the Amazon basin originally developed by Texaco 
and now operated by Petroecuador, the state oil company.  Of remaining proven reserves 
of 21 billion barrels, 3.5 billion can be extracted using current methods and 11 billion 
could be extracted using advanced technology.  Private oil companies (e.g., Occidental, 
Oryx, YPF Ecuador) operating under service and participation contracts have brought 
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new fields on line and production could increase further with the construction of a new 
oil pipeline.42 
According to the Central Bank of Ecuador the United States claims 38 percent of 
Ecuador's Export Market and is responsible for 31 percent of imports to Ecuador.  In 
Ecuador-U.S. trade, oil has been Ecuador's main export, but in achieving this mark have 
driven to near extinction some of the smaller indigenous nationalities.  Where once a 
community might number 20,000 inhabitants are now reduced to around 1,000. 43  
However, Ecuador remains a marginal oil supplier to the U.S. with a share of less than 
1.5 percent of the import market.  Petroleum is not covered by trade preferences. 44  
Ecuador is one of Latin America's largest crude oil exporters, which makes it important 
in the context of world energy markets.  Exploration has shown that 2.1 billion barrels of 
oil reserves exist within Ecuador predominately on indigenous territory.  In 1999, 
calculations arrived at a figure of 379,600 barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil are produced.  
Domestic consumption accounts for only 152,000 bbl/d allowing for the remaining two 
thirds to be exported.45   
The indigenous peoples have suffered from a "government that has failed to 
regulate and supervise the activities of both the state-owned oil company and of its 
licensee companies."46  Extreme environmental damage has occurred from over 20 years 
of oil production.  Oil exports are fast becoming the main source of government revenue 
for Ecuador as the price of oil achieved levels within the high $20 to low $30 price band 
in 2000.  "The oil price collapse of 1998-1999 had negative ramifications for the 
Ecuadorian oil industry, as maintenance was postponed and wells were shut in."47  As an 
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attempt at partial privatization of the state oil company Petroecuador, plans were made to 
offer a tender in a bid to draw foreign direct investment (FDI).  To be included in the deal 
are Ecuador's five most successful fields: Shushufindi, Sacha, Libertador Cononaco, and 
Auca.  It is hoped that FDI will improve the collective production anywhere from 60,000-
100,000 bbl/d at the five fields.   Just over half of national production, 180,000 bbl/d in 
1999, was derived from these fields, and the trend has been downward.  Privatization of 
Petroecuador is expected although it is not known when.  Difficulties have continued to 
plague the process.  In one instance former President Mahuad asked for the resignation of 
Petroecuador president Jorge Pareja in November 1999.  Mahuad believed in privatizing 
and wished to accomplish the sale of the company quickly.  Pareja on the other hand was 
a supporter of retaining more government power over the daily operation, so due to 
differing opinions Pareja was out, but Mahuad would not last much longer himself.   
While a detailed privatization plan has not yet been presented, steps toward that end are 
anticipated.48   
Currently, the preponderance of the foreign investment in Ecuador is in the 
Amazon region, occupied by indigenous peoples, where Ecuador has the largest of its oil 
deposits.  The profit margin makes other areas such as agriculture where the indigenous 
peoples predominate the work force, unattractive to invest in.  As it stands now oil 
pipeline infrastructure in Ecuador acts as a bottleneck to production.  Any increase would 
have to come from a second pipeline 49.  "The major pipeline, the Trans-Ecuadorian 
(SOTE), extends about 300 miles from the Lago  Agrio area in the Oriente to the Balao 
terminal near the port city of Esmeraldas."50  First built by Texaco at the start of the 
1970s, the pipeline has undergone several renovations.  Capacity from these expansions 
has raised the average daily flow to around 365,00 bbl.  Projected expansions could 
increase this flow to 390,000 bbl/d.  With the only constraint being capacity on the SOTE 
operators have been forced to shut in more than 100,000 bbl/d of oil field capability.  
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With the single pipeline a range of crude gravities are mixed within, resulting in the 
Oriente's extensive variety of crude production to settle for an average price.   
The new pipeline is intended to lessen oil transfer capacity constraints and 
separate the higher quality crude.  However, it transits areas prone to earthquakes and an 
oil spill will contaminate indigenous peoples physical environment and their dietary 
staples.  Ecuador instituted new legislation making the construction of pipelines easier.  
A consortium of seven multinationa l corporations headed by Canada's Alberta Energy 
received permission to begin construction of the $1.1 billion pipeline.  The consortium, 
which also includes Repsol-YPF (Spain), Kerr-McGee (USA), AGIP (Italy), Perez 
Companc, and Techint of Argentina, and Occidental Petroleum (USA), will operate on a 
20-year BOOT (Build Own Operate Transfer) contract.  The latest legislation, TROLE II, 
permits private companies to own and operate pipelines in perpetuity. 51  In the past, all 
infrastructures concerning oil had to be turned over to the government after a suitable 
period of time had elapsed.  The new law also will allow pipeline owners to set tariffs of 
their own choosing and loosen up requirements for downstream outlay by producers.  
"Once the pipeline is completed, Ecuador's transport capacity could increase to as much 
as 700,00-800,000 bbl/d, allowing for significant increases in oil production."52     
Two companies, Perez Companc and Cayman Oil have been exploring in 
Ecuador's most productive region, the Oriente and have been successful in their efforts.  
Both companies triumphed with their test wells in the province tapping what is projected 
to be 555 million barrels of reserves, and stimulating additional exploration.  These 
activities generate byproducts and toxic wastes that are improperly disposed of on 
indigenous peoples territory.  However, difficulties with the indigenous have caused 
some companies to sell their assets in Ecuador.  In August 1999 the Japan National Oil 
Corporation announced its intention to cease all efforts in the country.  In October 1999, 
Arco not only decided to divest itself of Ecuadorian possessions, but also of its 
potentially profitable properties in Colombia and Peru.  As a consortium associate in 
Arco's efforts in Ecuador, Agip was able to take over operations in Arco's Villano field.  
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"In July 2000, CMS Energy sold its Ecuadorian assets to Crestar Energy of Alberta, 
Canada."53  One of the factors that caused this move was increasing pressures from 
indigenous demonstrations and lega l actions showing that the indigenous population is 
not in agreement with the Ecuadorian government’s pro-oil policies. 
 
C.  FISCAL POLICY 
Looking back to 1997, President Alarcon saw the imposition of major revenue 
measures as the wrong policy.  With an eye toward helping the poor, he instead decided 
to improve tax and debt collections and fix fuel distributor profit margins in order to 
lower the budget deficit.  The next year, he again allowed a monthly scheme for gasoline 
price adjustments, but would not allow the elimination of state subsidies for cooking gas 
and electricity, which hurt the financing of government spending.  Congress’ rejection of 
Alarcon’s proposal, raising the value-added tax from 10 percent, hindered the best 
method of funding the government’s budget shortfall.  This resulted in the selling of large 
amounts of short-term (one-year) domestic debt.  As Alarcon's interim presidency came 
to an end in August of 1998, President Mahuad's first actions were to cut gas and 
electricity subsidies in an attempt to shrink the budget deficit from 7 to 5.5 percent of 
GDP, and in so doing enraged the indigenous who survive at a subsistence level.   
Mahuad's ability to work with Congress led to the replacement of the income tax 
system.54  The previous sys tem had taxed personal income at 10-25 percent, corporate 
income at 44.4 percent and foreign remittances at 36 percent. 55  Fiscal troubles led 
Congress to vote in a makeshift fiscal package in May.  This legislation brought back the 
income tax at significantly lowered levels for the year 2000 and lessened the estimated 
fiscal deficit to a more controllable point of 5.8 percent of GDP.  In the medium-term the 
Noboa government needs a fiscal stabilization program, if they intend to qualify for the 
IMF stand by program.  After President Noboa's elevation to the presidency in 2000, he 
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instituted considerable increases in energy prices and rates at the start of June despite 
indigenous protests.56 
 
D.  MONETARY AND EXCHANGE POLICY 
Commencing in February 1999, the sucre was allowed to float freely against the 
U.S. dollar and other foreign currencies as the central bank discarded its crawling peg 
exchange rate system.  Until February the Central Bank had managed the currency float 
within a pre-announced band in order to control the market price of the sucre.  In an 
attempt to control inflation the Bank recurrently raised short-term interest rates and sold 
foreign reserves to bind the sucre’s depreciation.  Despite the efforts from February 1999 
to early January 2000, the sucre fell from 7,400 to nearly 30,000 to the dollar before 
being fixed at 25,000 to the dollar under President Mahuad's dollarization plan.  This 
action would be catastrophic for the poor, as prices would skyrocket and immediately 
engendered protests from the indigenous.  Nearly a year later, on September 9, 2000 
Ecuador completed the adoption of the U.S. dollar as its currency, and is characterized as 
the largest officially dollarized country in the world.57   
In the context of Ecuador the expression, dollarization refers to the dollar's entire 
replacement of the country's legal tender.58  Gross domestic product was then anticipated 
to grow 1.3 percent in 2000 up from an earlier forecast of zero percent.  Employment 
slowly began to rise and short-term interest rates dropped to about 10 percent of what 
they were just before dollarization.  With a national unemployment rate of 65 percent, 
few Ecuadorians, especially the indigenous peoples could enjoy any benefits of 
dollarization. 59  Ecuadorians during the process took more than 600 million and put it in 
local banks.  The central bank sold the public nearly 400 million in exchange for its 
sucres.  In the end the central bank still had about as much in foreign reserves as it did 
before the dollarization process began.  Confidence had risen such that foreign debt was 
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partly renegotiated and the monthly rate of inflation peaked and then began declining.60  
This was a major step in monetary reform and effectively removes the central bank from 
the economic picture as well as the temptation to print money.   
   
E.  INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Like the majority of Ecuadorians, the indigenous dislike the structural adjustment 
policies required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  They feel their 
implementation lowers the standard of living to a dangerous level and does nothing to 
alleviate economic problems in the state.  Despite widespread protests, an agreement was 
made with the IMF to a two-year stand-by loan with Ecuador in 1994.  This settled many 
questions internationally and allowed for multilateral program lending and discussions 
for the resolution of its foreign commercial debt.  The economic setbacks of 1995 and 
Ecuador's inability to reach agreed upon targets resulted in the programs cutoff.  At this 
time the Alarcon administration wanted a new accord with the IMF to allow a deferment 
of amount outstanding on government debts with the Paris Club.  As it stood the IMF 
decided against following up with a plan in conjunction with the Alarcon administration.  
Lacking political power, a number of necessary actions by the government, such as 
dropping state subsidies for cooking gas and electricity, movement in the direction of 
privatizing state-owned enterprises and taking significant actions to close the fiscal 
deficit was not forthcoming.  The Noboa Administration was eventually able to achieve 
IMF concurrence for a one-year program in April 2000 although this was met by 
indigenous protests.   Discussions with the IMF centered on an estimated $400 million 
for the stand by program. 61  
 
F.  STRUCTURAL REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION  
Market-oriented reforms are currently the economic principle of choice in Latin 
America, but Ecuador has been lackadaisical and selective in adopting them.  The New 
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Economic Model developed from the Washington Consensus accepts that market forces 
reinforce export- led growth and that the inverse applies equally well.62  Despite progress 
in the 1990’s completed on trade liberalization and monetary policy reforms, most 
administrations have been forced or chosen not to follow up and strengthen these 
reforms.  Implementing those structural changes essential for drawing investment and 
stimulating growth have not been pursued and many new laws, which allow private 
participation in the oil sector, privatization of shares in state companies, and banking 
transformation are not producing the desired results.  A telecommunications privatization 
law was enacted in 1995, yet those assets only recently were slated for sale in the year 
2001.63  As a result Ecuador is branded as a "nonreformer" whose policies are at most 
very timid at accomplishing any fiscal, trade or labor market reform. 64  As such, the 
economy does not provide opportunities for indigenous participation  
In the first few months of 2000 a new law was approved which incorporated 
essential fundamentals allowing for privatization in the electrical, telecommunications 
and petroleum sectors, areas where the indigenous have no stake.  Sale of the 
Government’s electrical distribution companies is planned in the generation and 
transmission facilities, but has progressed slowly.  Notwithstanding a number of short 
discussions, it has been politically impossible to seriously set proposals to privatize any 
of the many companies the armed forces gain revenue from.  Less than interested 
management has bankrupted the Social Security Institute and yet proposals to permit 
private pension funds have yielded solid opposition.  Congress has only debated ideas to 
revamp the failing educational system.  Any improvement would facilitate Ecuadorians 
ability to effectively participate in the international market.  Congress can easily turn 
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aside the introduction of new privatization initiatives, as happened in July 1999 to the 
Mahuad government.65 
 
G.  TRADE BARRIERS  
Tariff Barriers are a key indicator of openness to the world economy and their 
reduction can help the process of export- led development.  Their presence in Ecuador is a 
result of the ISI policy, and their removal has grave implication for the industries 
dependent on them and the middle-class employed in this sector.  Ecuador has made 
strides in liberalizing its trade policies since 1990, with many reductions of tariffs and 
tariff dispersion.  They have eliminated most non-tariff surcharges, and enacted an in-
bond processing industry law resulting in a relatively open market to imports and direct 
investment.  The state also reduced its investment in rural infrastructure and endangered 
many small land holdings of indigenous peoples.  In January 1996, the country decided 
that most of its tariff rates would be 30 percent or less in a plan titled Harmonized System 
of Nomenclature, to honor its commitment to the regulations of the WTO.  In the time 
since joining the WTO, the average applied tariff rate has been around 13 percent ad 
valorem. This is more a reflection of a regional organization, the Andean Community, 
and its Common External Tariff (CET).  This works on a four-tiered structure with levels 
of 5 percent applying to most raw materials and capital goods, 10 or 15 percent for 
intermediate goods, and 20 percent for the majority of consumer goods.66   
The Andean Common External Tariff (CET) itself has a range of 0-20 percent.  A 
35 percent duty is reserved for automobile imports to protect the local assembly business.  
Intermediate goods are typically imported at 10 or 15 percent duty.  The majority of 
consumer imports fall within the 20 percent range.  Unprocessed or raw materials used by 
manufactures and capital goods usually are charged nothing or at the most, 5 percent.  
There are some capital goods and industrial inputs that garner special attention from the 
state.  These tariffs have reduced employment opportunities leaving urban households to 
take up informal jobs.  Indigenous peoples would now find unstable employment in the 
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urban areas, making them migratory.  Exceptions under the Andean common tariff have 
been made for Ecuador that permits for lower duties on these items.  A transitional 
safeguard system allows Ecuador to slowly withdraw from the Harmonized System of 
Nomenclature starting in March 1999.  Automotive parts, home appliances and corn are 
some of the items that have been exempted from this system.  Many anticipate that this 
method will be done away with entirely, however a timetable has yet to be decided 
upon.67  
Non-Tariff Barriers offer a less visible yet no less effective means of closing the 
economy to foreign competition. 68  One method requires approval from a number of 
ministries for many goods before they may be imported.  These can be any items such as 
processed foods, cosmetics, liquors, certain medical disposables, agricultural, gambling 
equipment, animal feed, mineral fertilizers, and vegetable seeds to name just a few.  
Another technique of restricting import quantities is based on the arbitrary use of 
sanitary/phytosanitary rules.  This mainly affects farm products that are not permitted to 
enter Ecuador.  Also, certain official and unofficial quantitative restrictions are created by 
Ecuador.  With the exception of tractors, used motor vehicles falls into this category.  
While the government may implement a new policy authorizing the importation of used 
agricultural equipment, the current policy makes it difficult for indigenous peoples to 
effectively farm their land using antiquated equipment.  Also on the agenda is the 
importation of used vehicles for public transportation use, on which the indigenous 
peoples depend, such as buses and taxis, but in this case an alteration to the transit law 
must be made.  The Andean price band system also comes into play as a number of 
agricultural commodities fall under that system, which was created to protect local 
farmers.  This system also includes a variable additional duty for third party imports 
based upon world prices.69  
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H.  FINAL ASSESSMENT 
This section has attempted to provide a quick yet complete picture of the political-
economic situation of Ecuador in the past.  We can see how single commodities have 
prevented diversification and why gains are distributed to a select few.  The decline in 
cocoa, banana, or oil prices and the ensuing bust is a reflection of the extreme 
vulnerability dependence on one commodity creates.  The ISI policy failed to provide 
stunning growth, and the follow on adjustment policies seem only to exacerbate the 
problems among the poorer sectors.  Of interest is the contrast in ideas of the many 
presidents and their actions.  The large number of them, nineteen in twenty years, along 
with military takeovers shows how quickly dissatisfaction with an unstable economic 
environment can shift politics.  In one way or another the economic problems are all 
connected to the wealthy elite classes.  Anderson herself cites elite tendencies to side 
with the interests of the industrialized countries.  Also is the desire to shape policies that 
maintain their power over labor and resources.70  While oil has long been known to exist 
in Ecuador, the growth of that industry since 1917 has been nonexistent until the 
explosion of development in 1972 and its subsequent nationalization.  The expansion of 
oil into the Amazon renders the land unusable for subsistence farming, does not provide 
jobs for the local indigenous, return revenue or social programs to them, and has been 
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III. ECUADORIAN POLITICS 
The indigenous people of Ecuador have suffered from a system of cultural, 
economic and political exclusion since the period of colonial rule.  Before the transition 
from military rule, illiteracy legally prevented these people from political participation in 
the system, as the majority could not read Spanish, their second language.  While the 
latest constitution protects the rights of these people, those declarations have by and large 
remained unfulfilled.  In conflicts with the ruling elite, their interests have often been set 
aside.  A class-based system constructed to ensure domination of the indigenous has 
made them a submissive people in the eyes of the other sectors of the population, and 
easily discriminated against.   Many reforms had been purposely obstructed in order to 
prevent the extension of full civil rights to the indigenous.71  Depending on primarily 
subsistence farming to survive, the national government is only focused on the 
interregional tensions between the Sierra landed elite and the costal oligarchy.  Problems 
of "representation, populism, murky relationship between the different branches of 
government, and the ongoing lack of institutional legitimacy" have force the indigenous 
to seek other means of political voice.  This chapter will show why the government has 
failed to incorporate the indigenous nor been able to provide them with a legal voice in 
the political process.   
 
A.  THE POLITICAL PARTIES 
"The formulation of a coherent growth strategy under democratic auspices 
ultimately hinge on whether political institutions allow for effective management of a 
market economy while remaining accountable to the interests and aspirations of 
competing social and economic interests."72  Based on a cultural paradigm, political 
parties have called the indigenous peoples as "the greatest weight the nation had to 
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bear."73 In 1979 the government of Ecuador was transferred from military to civilian rule 
when Jaime Roldós Aguilera was elected president.  With that election came a new 
constitution with its major feature granting illiterates the right to vote.  The voting 
proportion of the population expanded in that single act from about 15 percent to 21 
percent in 1979 and 31 percent in the 1984 election. 74  Politics in Ecuador today can be 
characterized as a fragmented party system, which creates the added problem of minority 
governments.  Regionally fragmented voting and the application of a closed- list 
proportional representation system, coupled with an electoral cycle that includes midterm 
elections results in a situation conducive to the creation of many parties.  The subsequent 
party rivalries and factionalism usually makes it complicated to pass legislation. 75   
An incoming president would have some support in Congress at the start of his 
term will likely have it vanish in the midterm election.  A personal conflict among 
members within a party often fosters the creation of new parties.  The closed list 
proportional representation system means popular members with large followings can 
start their own party rather than subject oneself to the leadership's authority.  The ban on 
immediate reelection of deputies also encourages the creation of new parties, increasing 
the lack of order.  Government patronage often causes defection from opposition parties, 
often received in exchange for votes on executive sponsored bills.76  This lack of focus 
among party elite was reflected in their inability to understand let alone respond to 
indigenous peoples demands of the June 1990 uprising.77 
Another feature of Ecuadorian parties are party registration rules that encourage 
politicians to switch sides that in effect reduces internal coherence and threatens the party 
survival.  Parties that do not earn 5 percent of the votes cast in two consecutive elections 
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lose their license to participate in upcoming elections.  Originally intended to reduce the 
existence of multi-parties in Ecuador, this regulation encouraged small parties to invite 
celebrity candidates into their ranks to guarantee their survival. 78  Parties purporting to 
represent indigenous peoples would have difficulty reaching the 5 percent minimum in 
the rural areas as they still hold to social and national assimilation.  Political parties suffer 
from factionalism, weak organization, and are overshadowed by personalistic 
movements.  As they are small, loose organizations, they depend on the populist 
candidate with enough charisma to retain the support of the masses.  Ideology often is a 
secondary consideration.  Persistent regional rivalries between the agrarian oriented, 
highland capital of Quito and the liberal, trade oriented, coastal region of which 
Guayaquil is the country's principal economic center, contribute to contentious political 
debates.79  
Two parties compose Ecuador's foremost Sierra-based center and center-left 
parties and advocate assimilation along the lines of the customary modernizing model for 
the indigenous people.  The first of these, Popular Democracy (DP) performed the best in 
the 1998 elections capturing the leading block in Congress (33 seats), while the 
Democratic Left (ID) won 17 seats.  Occupying the pragmatic center, the DP as of the 
1981-1984 presidency of Osvaldo Hurtado has been establishing itself as the party to 
beat.   However, following Mahuad's expulsion from office and extensive denigration of 
his 17-month administration, the party did extremely poorly in the May 2000 local 
elections.  The DP's most important member of Congress, Juan Jose Pons representing 
the coastal region, was President of that institution until a constituent of the PSC replaced 
him as its President in August 2000.  The DP will also suffer a massive wave of 
defections due to Hurtados' resignation from the party on September 18, 2001.  He was 
expected to make a run to succeed current President Noboa in the October 2002 elections.  
In order to do so, he will now have to join another party or found his own from among his 
supporters in the DP.80 
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Previous examples of resignations include retired General Paco Moncayo who 
was the ID bloc leader in Congress, and another ID member, Rene Yandun, a fellow 
retired General.  They are both now barred from that body after having announced their 
resignations in support of the January 21 protests by the indigenous peoples, where 
Mahuad was removed from office.  Quickly following these events, local elections 
witnessed the ID achieve considerable position in the Sierra with the return to power of 
Moncayo as Mayor of Quito and Yandun as Prefect of Carchi Province in May 2000.  
Ex-President Rodrigo Borja (1988-1992) is the ideological leader of the ID and maintains 
a visible civic presence in order to maintain his legitimacy as a contender for the 
presidency.  It was his administration that granted majority control over bilingual 
education programs to the indigenous people, which nearly caused his expulsion from the 
party.  When the social democratic ID had the power of the Presidential Palace, they 
promulgated an extensive economic position for the state, but were unsuccessful at 
improving public services or state competence in business.81    
A party with Maoist communist roots called the Popular Democratic Movement 
(MPD) is active in Ecuador.  It falls on the far left of the spectrum yet it won 2 seats in 
the 1998 elections.  It draws its strength from a number of public sector unions, together 
with the teachers union, UNE.  Anti-government protests are a common approach for 
MPD leaders.  Their constituents desire increased wages, guaranteed employment, and 
stopping needed reforms.  While the MPD could only draw 2 percent of the presidential 
vote in the last election, its local candidates improved from its 1996 record in May 2000, 
propelled by the intense economic failure.  However, among the organizations 
representing the indigenous people, all are careful to maintain a distinct separation from 
this and other communist based parties since their two ideologies have grown apart.  An 
additional congressional leader is the former President of Ecuador (1992-1996) Sixto 
Duran-Ballen currently of the Ecuadorian Communist Party (PCE). 82   Known as a 
conservative, he was an architect educated in America.  With his time in office he was 
able to implement a number of preliminary actions towards strengthening public finances 
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and laying the foundation for structural reforms.  With former President Duran-Ballen 
lending legitimacy, the party was able to win three seats in the 1998 elections.83  
The manner in which these parties have been established and their goals, holds no 
attraction for indigenous voters.  Ecuadorian political parties have no input in the policy-
making process and are "disconnected from the electorate."84  While many indigenous 
groups have been influenced by leftist ideology, they are not so much interested in a class 
struggle of the masses, as establishing their voice in the system using an identity-based 
ideology. 85  Indigenous organizations have developed due to land distribution problems 
but have found the most success with cultural demands.  They have won concessions on 
bilingual education and been able to recast their image to the overall population.  
Continuing to organize among different indigenous communities, they have developed an 
ability to arrange mass protests on an unprecedented scale.86  The ability of indigenous  
groups to influence national political actors, write alternative law proposals, and question 
the neoliberal policies of the state have placed these organizations in a unique social 
position.  While agrarian reform has remained elusive, their political style has highlighted 
the government's inability to uphold civil and human rights of the indigenous.   
 
B.  POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 
While the benefits of presidentialism have been debated, its function does depend 
on "the president's legislative powers, the party system and upon societal conditions."87  
It is only through the office of the president that indigenous issues have been addressed.  
That process has not been perfect.  Since 1984 conflicts between the executive branch, 
the unicameral legislature and the judiciary have sporadically stunned Ecuador.  These 
                                                 
83 Library of Congress. "Country Studies/Area Hand Book, Ecuador," 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html  Accessed 3/7/2001. 
84 Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R. Scully, Building Democratic Institutions Party Systems in Latin 
America. Stanford University Press, Stanford. 1995. 435. 
85 Chalmers, Douglas A.  et al The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America. Oxford University 
Press. New York. 1997. 176.  
86 Selverston, Melina H. "Indigenous Peoples and the State in Ecuador." In Van Cott, Donna Lee, ed., 
Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America. New York. St. Martin's Press. 1994. 132.  
87  Mainwaring, Scott and Matthew Soberg Shugart et al, Presidentialis m and Democracy in Latin 
America.  Cambridge University Press, New York. 1997. 4. 
32 
clashes were especially manifest during the authoritarian like rule, 1984-88, of the 
Febres-Cordero administration.  A narrow victory for the Social Christian Party (PSC), 
his style provoked military mutinies and his short kidnapping by defiant troops.  During 
his tenure the United States enjoyed close relations with Ecuador.  Starting early in his 
administration, Febres-Codero launched a free-market economic strategy, and took tough 
positions in opposit ion to drug trafficking and terrorism.  However, for the indigenous 
people his policies of employing brutal tactics against social protest, suspension of 
agrarian reform and supporting violence against land takeovers represented a reversal of 
hard won victories.  His administration ended with the nation's economic troubles 
deepening as a destructive earthquake in March of 1987 temporally halted oil exports.88 
Rodrigo Borja Cevallos of the Democratic Left (ID) party assumed control of the 
presidency in August 1988.  As a millionaire businessman from Guayaquil, Cordero had 
believed in a free market economy, as well as strong executive control of all areas of the 
government.  Borja Cevallos, a social democrat from Quito, espoused a mixed economy, 
where the state would direct some aspects, and a pluralist government.  In his first two 
years he was successful in reducing the austerity brought on by his predecessor.89  He 
committed his administration to improving the protection of human rights, reforms 
opening foreign trade in Ecuador, and concluding an accord that resulted in the 
disbanding of the small terrorist group, "Alfaro Lives."90   In indigenous matters he 
officially recognized one group as the representative of the indigenous people with 
negotiating power, responsibility over bilingual education, and tow communal land 
concessions.  These actions produced expectations for other area such as land disputes 
that would eventually prove disappointing.  As economic difficulties continued to rise the 
popularity of the ID began to fall, and opposition parties achieved power over Congress 
in 1990.91 
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After trying for the third time, Sixto Duran-Ballen finally won the presidency in 
1992.  His administration's popularity experienced a down turn as macroeconomic 
adjustment measures produced austerity.  Economic hardship produced a general increase 
in violence against the indigenous as their backwardness was commonly thought to be 
holding back the country. 92  Duran-Ballen did succeeded with a few second-generation 
economic reforms passing through Congress.  His secret implementation of a new 
Agrarian Law prompted swift protest from the indigenous people who felt that it 
promoted large-scale agriculture industry at the expense of small indigenous farmers.  
After police repression and a 'mobilization decree' amendments to the new law were 
agreed to via negotiation with the president.  The economy itself experienced growth of 
almost 4 percent in 1994, but turned sluggish in 1995 producing about 2.3 percent.  
Inflation began to fall from about 55 percent in 1992 to about 22 percent in 1995.  The 
vice president, Alberto Dahik, was the designer of the administration's successful 
economic strategy, but had to escape the country to evade trial on allegations of 
corruption subsequent to an intense political battle with the opposition in 1995.93  
In 1996 running for the Guayaquil based Ecuadorian Roldosista Party (PRE), 
Abdala Bucaram succeeded to the presidency pledging populist economic and social 
reforms, and as Bucaram called it breaking the power of the nation's "oligarchy."  Upon 
being inaugurated, Bucaram noted that it was the "first day of a people's administration, 
and the last day of supremacy of the oligarchs."94  For the duration of his short term of 
office, Bucaram's government was criticized for corruption and concern due to his fiery 
rhetoric mounted.  For the indigenous people he established the Ethnic and Cultural 
Ministry with two Amazon Indians to manage it.  Most indigenous groups saw the move 
as an attempt to split the indigenous people's movement between the Sierra and the 
Amazon, and secure his popularity.  However, after six months of austerity measures, an 
estimated 2 million citizens, including indigenous people, initiated a nationwide strike 
calling for Bucaram's removal.  The Congress deposed Bucaram in February 1997 on 
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justification of supposed mental incompetence.  In his place the president of Congress 
and head of the small Radical Alfarist Front party, Fabian Alarcon was appointed by 
Congress interim President.  In a May 1997 popular referendum, the population accepted 
Alarcon's provisional presidency. 95   
After a year of politicking congressional and first-round presidential elections 
were held on May 31.  As with previous elections, this one was extremely close requiring 
a run-off election between the top two candidates.  Quito Mayor Jamil Mahuad of the 
Popular Democracy party and Social Christian Alvaro Noboa were the participants.  
Mahuad won on July 12, 1998 by a narrow margin, but it was enough to satisfy the 
requirement for a majority.  On the day the new constitution came into effect, August 10, 
1998, he took office.  Escalating economic, fiscal, and financial trouble made its effect 
felt on his popularity as it gradually worsened.  After a little more than a year in office 
demonstrations in Quito by indigenous groups caused his downfall.  The military and 
police declined to impose public order.  On January 21, 2000 demonstrators rushed the 
National Assembly building, taking over the country, and assembling a three-person 
"junta," indigenous, judicial, and military to run the nation.  Support from the field grade 
military officers made the concept a reality.  Overnight President Mahuad had no choice 
but to abandon the presidential palace to secure his well-being.   
Learning from history, Vice President Gustavo Noboa took over the presidency 
based on negotiations involving the junta and senior military officers.  On the morning of 
January 22, Mahuad appeared on national television to back Noboa the successor.  In an 
emergency session of Congress held in Guayaquil later that day, Noboa was confirmed as 
President of the Republic in constitutional succession to Mahuad.96  Previous presidents 
had worked to raise the autonomy of their technocratic advisors, insulating them from 
congressional pressures.  This style of policy making would allow the indigenous to work 
directly with the president, yet it also excludes other groups "without direct channels of 
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representation. 97  For now Noboa's powers remain the same, yet he must continually 
negotiate with the indigenous who continue to protest adjustment policies.  Despite this in 
June of 2001 he approved construction of a new heavy crude pipeline via a controversial 
route.  In the process the constitutionally mandated prior public consultation with 
affected communities was avoided, and approval was based upon an inadequate 
Environmental Impact Assessment.98  So far, only legal action has been taken by the 
indigenous people and other concerned groups.    
 
C.  THE NEW CONSTITUTION 
In 1998 a National Constitutional Assembly specially elected for this purpose 
ratified constitutional modifications on August 10.  Of the 70 seats available, 45 were 
won by the major parties, leaving the rest to smaller parties, political movements and 
individual candidates.  Presumably some might have gone to indigenous people although 
it is doubtful.  The new constitution has explicitly made the executive branch the most 
powerful political institution in Ecuador.  Through the removal of mid-term 
congressional elections and limiting Congress' power to challenge cabinet ministers, the 
president's position becomes more secure.  The new constitution also added more reactive 
presidential powers such as vetoing legislation on constitutional grounds. 99   Party 
discipline is conventionally weak, and customarily many deputies change loyalties at 
some point in each Congress.  Conversely, once the new Constitution went into 
operation, the Congress approved a code of ethics, which entails consequences for 
members who disregard their party leadership on crucial votes.100  These changes signify 
to the indigenous that only negotiation with the president can they express their interests. 
Only a Constitutional Court can overturn vetoes, so congressional influence in the 
policy making process has been effectively reduced.  Also eliminated is the referendum 
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option of legislative override where a popular referendum could override a veto.  
Furthermore the new constitution stipulates that only the executive can introduce the 
budget and that congress cannot propose increases in expenditures or revenues.  This is 
completely opposite of the 1979 constitution, which established that members of congress 
had the right to increase expenditures so long as government revenues were raised in 
equal measure.  The new constitution also established in separate survival that a 
congressional majority censure does not have the authority to remove a cabinet minister.  
A two-thirds vote is required to censure however, the president can retain his minister if 
he wishes.  Needless to say, executive independence with regard to the legislature is 
superior.  Unaccountably, impeachment has been made difficult to use when dismissing a 
president on grounds of violation of the constitution. 101   For the indigenous people  
Congress continues as a block on representation, where its powers have been undermined 
and working outside the system remains the only choice.   
"Indigenous leaders claim that the current system is a foreign one which fails to 
respect indigenous cultures or acknowledge their existence."102  The idiosyncrasies of 
Ecuador's "improved" institutional structure lead to the destabilizing conflicts the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches can never resolve.  While the judiciary is an 
independent body, it lacks the authority required to effectively check the abuse of 
presidential powers.  The Ecuadorian Supreme Court carried out many judicial functions 
usually associated with the nation's highest court however, it did not rule on 
constitutional issues.  The Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees, which is a non-judicial 
appendage of the National Congress, exercises that function.  By de facto the legislative 
body now has the power to control interpretation of the Constitution as they see fit.103  
Even though it has slight control over the public budget and can no longer eliminate 
cabinet ministers from office, Congress can obstruct the executive's program and can 
censure officials.  The one power the president has yet to be granted is the ability to 
dissolve Congress during periods of deadlock, but is being lobbied for.   
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C.  CURRENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
During the height of the Cold War Ecuador's government was marked by political 
shakiness and reformist military rule.  After elections were held in 1978, civilian 
government returned to Ecuador in 1979.  A simple definition of consolidated democracy 
would call six successive free elections and quiet transfers of rule as having achieved 
stability in politics.  However, in both 1997 and 2000 elected Presidents were obliged to 
leave office before the end of their terms.  These events can at best be termed quasi-
constitutional.  The removal of President Bucaram was made official in a nationwide 
referendum and legitimized the actions of Congress in February 1997.  Nonviolent 
protests had forced him from the Presidential Palace and Congress seized the opportunity.  
Yet again on January 21, 2000, a mass of indigenous protesters, assisted by local military 
units took over the vacant National Congress.  Bolstered by success they marched on the 
Presidential Palace upon which Mahuad then deserted the Palace.  The situation was 
untenable as the Armed Forces chose not to protect the President.  The leaders quickly 
established a civil-military Triumvirate to lead the country.  Negotiations later the same 
day resulted in Vice-President Noboa's (Mahuad's constitutional successor) elevation to 
the presidency.  President Mahuad himself later stated that he would not block Noboa's 
taking office and was "overthrown."  This made it necessary for Congress to vote if 
Mahuad had abandoned his post, so on January 22 Noboa was recognized as the 
President.104  
President Noboa's term in office will continue until January 2003.  Noboa is not a 
member of a large, well known political party and so must create coalitions of several 
parties in Congress in order to pass desired legislation.  The Popular Democratic Party 
(DP) of former President Mahuad and the coastal-based Social Christian Party (PSC) 
have been his main supporters, but skill as a politician has garnered votes from other 
parties on single issues such as tax reform.  The year 2000 was a difficult one with 2001 
only slightly better.  The task of sustaining political support for reform was challenged by 
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many protest marches supported by indigenous people.  Government mandated bus fare 
hikes and fuel subsidy cuts incited a wave of violence in February 2001, and resulted in a 
declared state of emergency. 105  Negotiations resolved the crisis, but the dilemma of 
easing the growing social tension versus restoring economic growth in order to cut the 
fiscal deficits that have beleaguered Ecuador in recent years has produced unsatisfactory 
results.106   
 
D.  EVALUATING THE GOVERNMENT 
Once civilian government was again created, an old pattern has shown its 
dominance in which administrations of the center- left rotate with those of the center-
right.  These organizations working in the two urban cores and founded around selective 
incentives, had no reason to include indigenous people's needs in their rhetoric, and in 
fact view parties with disdain.107  Only those politicians who can sway the voting public 
in their search for ways to make needed economic changes at the smallest social cost, can 
remain in power.  Regardless of two decades of civilian politicians running the country, 
Ecuador's political institutions continue to be weak.  Part of the problem is Ecuador's elite 
who are divided along regional, ideological, and personal lines.  The lack of partisanship 
has fashioned politics to the point where the means to complete necessary economic and 
governmental reforms is impossible, even with repetitive, unfinished adjustments that 
have resulted in public demonstrations.  Paradoxically, when the nation is threatened its 
people unite, but in Ecuador the 1998 peace accord with Peru has instead further 
separated the parties for the time being.  With Noboa in charge, the battles have 
continued between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, 
predominantly on issues dealing with the public budget, bank ing and presidential 
appointments.108   
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Recurrent internal splits have created intense factionalism founding the conviction 
that the president is the final arbiter between the two institutions, a continuation of 
caudillism.  While the president is given strong powers, with the ability to rule by decree 
at times; the 11 or more parties of Congress can develop a strong desire for consensus on 
major issues often times leading to compromise.  In Congress opposition forces are 
organized on an ad hoc basis, but in the past they have frequently united to block the 
proposals of various administrations, and to remove cabinet ministers and presidents from 
time to time.109  Additionally, evidence has shown that the parties are "little more than 
vehicles for the conduct of intra-class struggle, and where Ecuadorian politics reflects 
few issues beyond personal rivalries and regionalism."110   In Ecuador's presidential 
governance, the importance of the party system in organizing support for or opposition to 
reform is critical.  "Fragmented party systems encourage bidding wars among contending 
political forces, make legislative support difficult to mobilize and ruling coalitions hard 
to sustain, and contribute to political instability."111   Without holding a majority in 
Congress, and the lack of party discipline rank the partisan powers of the president as 
low.  The new constitution was drafted and ratified primarily by an elected constituent 
assembly, and did not extend any greater decree power to the president, therefore limiting 
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IV. INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT 
A nation has normally been defined as made up of free and equal citizens who 
govern themselves through institutions of the state.  The formation of the state, implicitly 
accepted as a legal organization whose specific end is the exercise of control over a 
distinct area of land and to which are essentially subordinated the persons inhabiting it.113  
Despite the variety of cultures present, the new nation-state tends to construct a uniform 
society through common legislation, a central government, and a single authority instead 
of accommodating differences.  The country is furthermore brought under a distinct 
economic, and judic ial system based on the dominant Western ideal of individual private 
property.  This notion of the nation repeatedly makes the indigenous peoples adversaries 
facing the contemporary nation and condemning it to backwardness. 114  Two central 
sources leading to a clash thus exist, "one concerned property and the exploitation of the 
natural resources which had been linked by convention to the land of the assorted 
indigenous communities; the other is the inequality endured as the consequence of a lack 
of social and cultural assimilation with the rest of the populace of the particular 
nation."115   
A threat to democracy thus exists when the "representative covenant" is broken.  
Indigenous movements raise the awareness among the citizens of frustration with 
democracy.  Questions follow as to "how many people believe that democracy is a sham, 
how well organized they are, what their capacities for collective action are, how long they 
have been nurturing these kinds of sentiments, and what capacities the specific country 
has to absorb such a critical situation."116  When these conditions prove unfavorable, then 
democracy has broken down.  A group or movement needs only to find resources to 
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effect a takeover of the government and secure its position against forces of the ruling 
elites.   
 
A.  INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 
The indigenous people's image of social involvement is inextricably attached to 
the region where the community is found.  The diverse native group's that have been 
formed in the countries of Latin America have come to pass out of the need to deal at first 
with agrarian oligarchies and more recently with business corporations with interests in 
agriculture, mining, petroleum, etc.  The greater part of these movements have an 
indigenous select few that acts out of the necessity to preserve and also to renew the 
societies.  They are normally made up of university educated young people who while 
living in an metropolitan locale preserved their roots in the community, of leaders taught 
in cooperative or union activism, of elements of different religious rule, and also of 
artisans and merchants.  Frequently, this elite fashion organizations intended to turn 
indigenous peoples into social, cultural and political players on the regional or national 
arena thus far controlled by non-Indians.117   
Indigenous leaders, who support the class school of thought, encourage 
involvement by Indians in class organizations such as trade and peasant unions.  Leftist 
parties and movements, by populist and nationalist organizations, as well by those 
progressive administrations that have decide on the amalgamation of indigenous peoples 
into the public society, have customarily implement this strategy.  The ethnic school is 
made up of persons who feel that a wholly class approach will connote the loss of an 
indigenous distinctiveness and will lead to incorporation by means of acculturation. 118  
Inside this discipline there are two very singular directions.  On the one hand there are 
those who rebuff the main social order as completely foreign, colonial and tyrannical.   
At the same time there are also those who are aware that in addition to cultural values 
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there are class interests, which steer them to search for coalitions with other communal 
groups.119   
There have been government-authorized programs to recognize and to some 
extent to absorb the indigenous populations, but in all of them the disagreement over 
rights to the territories of the indigenous peoples has remained unsettled.  At the core of 
the issue are two doctrines the modern state appears reluctant to surrender: exclusive and 
indissoluble sovereignty and individual private property.  The most general propensity in 
the handling of the question of indigenous peoples by the Latin American states, 
originates from the conception that the central state itself has of the circumstances of the 
indigenous peoples.  The culturist school perceives indigenous people as secondary, not 
included into the national culture needing mechanism, first and foremost in the area of 
education, to advance integration.  The structuralists give precedence to socioeconomic 
integration entailing the use of infrastructure and social services in order to stop the 
marginalization of the indigenous communities.  Both schools more or less unequivocally 
promote incorporation along the shape of the traditional modernizing model.120   
 
B.  ECUADORIAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
Sophisticated indigenous civilizations, about fifty loosely organized states 
prospered in Ecuador previous to the Inca Empire's subjugation of the area in the 15th 
century.  In 1534, the Spanish arrived and routed the Inca armies, and Spanish settlers 
develop into the new elite.  The indigenous population was annihilated by sickness in the 
first decades of Spanish rule, a moment when the natives also were enforced into the 
"encomienda" labor method for Spanish property-owners. 121   Today Ecuador's 
population is ethnically varied.  The most prevalent ethnic groups are indigenous and 
mestizo (mixed Amerindian-Caucasian).  While Ecuadorians were deeply concentrated in 
the mountainous central highland area not many decades past, today's population is 
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divided about evenly between that locale and the coastal lowlands.  Migration toward 
municipalities in all provinces has enlarged the urban population to about 55 percent.  
The tropical forest regions to the east of the mountains remain thinly populated and 
include only about 3 percent of the population. 122 
Commencing with the 1996 election, the indigenous populations discarded its 
long-established procedure of rejecting the official political scheme and energetically 
involved themselves.  The indigenous- labor union association identified as Pachakutik 
materialized as a power in 1996 when it won 10 percent of then 80-person chamber with 
votes from the heavily indigenous Sierra and Amazon districts.  In 1998, Pachakutik won 
only four seats in the larger (123-member) new congress, but commonly is supported by 
four other independent votes there.  In May 2000, Pachakutik scored impressive gains in 
local elections, winning several provincial prefectures for the first time and several mid-
sized municipalities.  Nina Pacari, second Vice President of Congress and a strong 
advocate of indigenous rights in Ecuador, is the most prominent Pachakutik leader.123  
The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) was 
fashioned out of the amalgamation of two previously formed organizations, 
ECUARUNARI and CONFENIAE.  ECUARUNARI, the regional organization of the 
Sierra that has been running for over 20 years, and the Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon representing 850 member communities.  Created 
in 1980 the main objectives of the CONFENIAE are the defense and the legalization of 
the indigenous territories, the preservation of the ecosystems and of the natural 
resources. 124   Created that same year is the National Coordinating Council of the 
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONACNIE).  CONACNIE formed the nucleus on 
long deliberations to elucidate the conditions and objectives of the movement.  
Languages separated them, but the problems they have in common unified them.  The 
lack of land, racial discrimination, lack of bilingual education, and the need for voice in 
government set the agenda.  As with their culture, the foundation organizations formulate 
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resolutions and the leadership of CONAIE serves as an agent between those decisions 
and the means taken. 125   
From December 15-18, 1993 the Fourth Congress of CONAIE was held resulting 
in a political declaration to construct a New Multinational Nation.  The political 
objectives of the indigenous peoples and ethnic groups endeavor to secure the 
achievement of their particular rights and recommend the harmonic and unprejudiced 
growth of all of society in an environment of peace and full democracy.  Recognizing that 
they are an substitute political force their objective is the construction of an alternative 
multinational state and the installation of a multinational, democratic government 
conscientious of the well being of all the nationalities that make up Ecuador and assuring 
the physical and sacred security of the family, the community, and society in general.  
Their purpose is not the difficult taking control of government, but the renovation of the 
character of the present hegemonic, exclusivist, ant-democratic and oppressive state and 
the construction of the new, humanist multinational society.  The aim is to restore the 
communal political and economic rights deprived of by the governing segment "through 
all institutional means, or exhausting that, the final recourse of self-defense permitted by 
international bodies and the existing constitution."126   
In answering questions concerning the demand for autonomy, Luis Macas, 
president of CONAIE in 1993, affirmed autonomy is based on the elements of territory, 
political administration, social organization, and the development of the peoples in a 
manner of their own choosing.  "What we want is that our form of self-organization, our 
way of justice in our own communities, be respected, because there is indigenous 
legislation that has no t been recognized by the state."127  Antonio Vargas, president since 
1996, in an interview said "the objective of Ecuador's indigenous peoples is not power, 
but to create social change from within; we caused a shake-up in the political class, and it 
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was made clear that there is a rebellious population here that will make change without 
violence."128  
 
C.  ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MOVEMENT 
Throughout the opening six years in which CONAIE existed, the consolidation of 
organizations on behalf of the majority of indigenous nationalities in Ecuador has proven 
to be one of the most important successes.  An additional one has been increasing the 
ability to call upon the union of the indigenous societies.  One that stands out the most is 
the presence that the indigenous movement has at the national level.  The fundamental 
ambition expressed by the indigenous movement is the struggle for territory.  
Disagreements over land that have been disregarded, delayed and forgotten, served as the 
key cause for the Indian Uprising that shook the country from May 28 to June 10, 1990 
and included other items such as the detrimental effects of structural adjustment policies, 
irrigation access, and skyrocketing inflation. 129   In the Indigenous March for Life 
supporting the indigenous communities of Pastaza and their organization OPIP in April 
and March of 1992 highlighted the support all the indigenous organizations of the 
country went out of their way to give.  Further uprisings objecting to structural 
adjustment and omission from government fo llowed in 1994 and 1997.  In that time, the 
indigenous groups progressively gained "broader support from mestizo campesinos, 
students, the urban poor and leftists."130    
Given the success of the 1997 civil unrest, CONAIE has developed into an 
essential component of any social mobilization and is frequently conferred with by 
opposition groups.  A strike initiated by the United Patriotic Front attributed the 
weakness of it to CONAIE's failure to support it.   The 2000 "January Days" National 
Salvation Junta formed by CONAIE, had extensive popular support that is confirmed by 
examination of public opinion, which found 71 percent of all Ecuadorians approved of 
                                                 
128 Lucas, Kintto, World News, "Politics-Ecuador: Power Is Not Indigenous Goal, Says Leader."  
http:www.oneworld.org/ips2/jan00/23_28_078.html  Accessed 10/1/2001.   
129 Zamosc, Leon. "Agrarian Protest and the Indian Movement in the Ecuadorian Highlands." Latin 
American Research Review. 29(30): 37-68. 1994. 
130 Velpel, Mary, "Ecuador: Crisis In Democracy,"  http://vaxxine.com/cowac/ecuador2.htm  
Accessed 10/15/2001.   
47 
the occupation of the Congress.  After determined protests by the indigenous movement 
in 1998, the state acknowledged the "plurinational and pluricultural" character of the 
nation.131  In February of 2001 President Noboa met with Antonio Vargas to end a wave 
of violent demonstrations where negotiations produced a partial rollback on bus fares and 
fuel subsidy cuts.  Middle and lower class Ecuadorians are attracted to this non-violent 
movement, which can articulate their interests at time when the government is indifferent 
due to its weak representative role.  As the solitary consistent and active resistance force 
in Ecuadorian politics, the indigenous movement has provided the central point for 
opposition, a means of expression for dissent.132   
 
D.  INDIGENOUS PEOPLE'S GRIEVANCES  
The assembly of a heavy crude pipeline is the administration's response to salvage 
Ecuador's fledging economy that has been overwhelmed by record highs of outside debt 
and commercial bank collapse.  In the course of an agenda titled Apertura 2000, the 
government's strategy is to double oil production and exports and privatize oil 
infrastructure thereby attracting foreign investments to its newly dollarized economy.  
This venture is being publicized equally to the government and global creditors as the 
primary mechanism for the country's economic revitalization.  Moreover it is one of the 
most important conditions of the government's structural adjustment accord with the IMF 
for making good on the country's balance payments.133  The Ecuadorian Armed forces 
are moderately self- funded by means of a reported obligated portion of petroleum 
revenues and a complex of military-owned companies.  The military has the benefit of 
considerable independence over its own dealings and, in isolated areas of the country; the 
military often is the primary government presence.  Progressively more, the Armed 
Forces have been solicited to carry out a law and order role, as was the case when a State 
of Emergency was declared in Guayas province at the beginning of 1999.   
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For the foreseeable future, the quality of life for persons who reside in oil 
generating sections or in close proximity to refineries continue to deteriorate. These 
groups of people understand first hand the grave environmental and social shock of the 
oil industry together with the utmost rates of cancer and other degenerative syndromes in 
Ecuador.  For example, the risk of throat cancer is 30 times greater, and the risk of liver 
cancer 15 times greater than in the rest of the country. 134  Currently for the indigenous, 
the one key point of controversy in the fight against oil is the lack of constitutionally 
mandated prior public consultation. Until mid April, when the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) was accomplished, not any of the impinged on communities had been 
conferred with concerning the development or informed about its impacts.  However, the 
agreement, which set the predetermined course through protected parts, was signed in 
February.  In May, Acción Ecológica alongside CONAIE and the Syndicate of 
Petroecuador Engineers and Professionals filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional court to 
invalidate the OCP agreement.  The court dismissed the lawsuit a number of weeks 
afterward, at the same moment the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Energy and 
Mines accepted the OCP's EIA. 135   
Ranchers, local conservation organizations and campesinos from the town of San 
Miguel de Los Bancos appealed for an injunction to prevent the assembly of the OCP 
through Mindo, by filing a second lawsuit in early June.  The plaintiffs have pointed out 
that the Ecuadorian government and OCP Consortium did not attempt to satisfactorily 
converse with concerned communities and consequently were in breach of the 
Ecuadorian Constitution, which directs previous discussions take place.  A third legal 
challenge will be filed by distressed populations in the northern Ecuadorian Amazon who 
would swallow the burden of enlarged crude production.  One chief apprehension is the 
plan to erect a refinery in the Amazon in order to process the heavy crude so that it may 
be transported through the pipeline.136  The government's reaction has been extremely 
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swift to protect this project.  President Noboa publicly stated that he would declare war 
on the ecologists, that he would fight them "trench by trench."137   
The indigenous have fought against oil companies in the past.  The authorized 
representatives of the people of San Vigilio solicited the government to uphold the 
constitution and "that the petroleum pipeline that has been illegally installed across their 
territories be immediately removed and all damages already caused by this illegal 
invasion be immediately repaired."138  Although the government may grant land titles to 
the indigenous people, they do not include the mineral rights, which constitutionally 
belong to the state.  Although the Ecuadorian regime asserts control of sub-surface 
minerals, the indigenous communities have by no means abandoned their rights to protect 
their lands and culture.  In October 1992, the Haurani came to Quito to protest in 
opposition to the oil companies searching and drilling oil on their property.  The 
government has the authority to take land titles away.  It had only just awarded to them 
title, so threatened revocation if they continued to protest.  The government furthermore 
delivered an admonition to the Hauranis that if they attempt to actually impede the oil 
companies, they would dispatch the military and basically gun down those Haurani.139   
Within April of 1998, the Atlantic Richfield Corporation (ARCO) was approved a 
500,000-acre oil dispensation identified as block 24 that is located completely on Shuar 
and Achuar land.  Tito Puanchir, president of the Shuar federation FIPSE explains, "we 
are unconditionally saying no to oil exploitation on our land."140  Santiago Kawarim, 
president of the Interprovincial Federation of the Achuar Indigenous Group of Ecuador 
(FINAE) said, "We are at war with ARCO."  Violent behavior over oil exploration 
transpired as Achuar and Shuar natives who regard them as turncoats harshly beat five 
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employees of ARCO.141  The government answer to the indigenous mobilization has 
repeatedly been violent or discussions that have been constructed generally in reaction to 
international demands.  In clashes with the government, deaths of indigenous people have 
occurred.142    
Another method adopted by the indigenous is legal action and "kidnapping."  To 
the former, a $1 billion federal class action suit was filed in the U.S. against Texaco, but 
was thrown out in late 1996.  Other companies under litigation are Burlington Resources, 
Atlantic Richfield Company, and Maxus Corporation, all for environmental damage to 
the homelands or violations of the constitution, which provides guarantees for the 
indigenous.  Some oil fields have been provided a military presence, tasked to provide 
security to all strategic areas.  Success did come on June 11 1999 as the sixth civil court 
of Pinchincha reached a final verdict against Maxus and Andrade Guitierrez corporations 
for deforestation, pollution and ecological destruction.  As for the latter, those attributable 
to the indigenous are at most detained employees who are shown the areas about to be 
destroyed.143  As the Ecuadorian government struggles to execute new economic plans, 
which slash social aid, the indigenous people are expected to organize in opposition to 
this.  Additionally, unremitting commercial development of their territory will also lead 
to mobilization of these groups.  They are liable to carry on their mobilization utilizing 
protest, which could spiral into violence if their level of poverty and destruction of their 
land increase. 
In the Amazon region colonists are driving the indigenous groups from their 
territory.  What might appear to be vacant land is being cleared and cultivated without 
regard for the indigenous.144 
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E.  ASSESSMENT 
The Ecuadorian indigenous movement has made itself the most powerful social 
organization in that country to date.  Their mobilization has exposed the deficiencies of 
the current political system.  Based on coordinated, mass demonstrations, the indigenous 
have created political space and affected some political structures concerning education 
and agriculture.  While participation and land have been the central demands of the 
indigenous, differences between the two major groups concerning participation in 
political parties has caused splits to occur within the organization.  Yet enough unity has 
remained to threaten the government.  Proposals such as a plurinational state are met with 
the view that the integrity of the nation may be jeopardized.  However, the true danger 
lies with the government's inability to be flexible and restructure itself to accommodate 
the indigenous.145   
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V. CONCLUSION 
As the previous chapters have shown, the indigenous peoples of Ecuador have 
experienced a history of economic and political exclusion.  Large tracts of cultivable land 
remain in the hands of a few elite despite attempts at land distribution reform.  Extending 
that trend will be the government's dependence on oil for revenue.  Its presence in 
indigenous territory has translated into environmental destruction of their way of life, and 
exclusion from the decision making process concerning their land.  Also shown is the 
political exclusion to which the indigenous have become accustomed.  The political 
parties have not developed into truly representative institutions, and serve only as 
vehicles for the ambitions of career politicians.  They have few ties to civil society as a 
whole and cannot provide input into the policy making process.  Without legitimacy, the 
indigenous have no reason to participate in this political institution.  The indigenous have 
developed organizations among themselves in order to create a voice in government and 
have made an impact on what they feel is not a representative or legitimate regime.  Their 
organizations, based on an ideology of ethnicity have developed along a separate line 
from 'the left' while making full use of confrontational tactics.   
The Government of Ecuador is not prepared to face a revolt from the indigenous 
population.  The Ecuadorian government is divided between the landed elite of the inland 
region and the power of the coastal region.  The indigenous populations have risen in the 
past to cause the overthrow of a democratically elected president.  The growing 
dominance of oil and the volatility of prices make Ecuador vulnerable to crisis.  In the 
landscape of possibilities, civil disobedience would not necessarily have to succeed in 
overthrowing the government, only to demonstrate their desire to alleviate the inequality 
and poverty that is rampant among the indigenous people.  The indigenous peoples use 
demonstrations to communicate their desires.  The resort to mass political violence may 
be a logical next step in the drive to decrease inequality and poverty that is rampant 
among the indigenous people. As Wilkinson states "if liberal democratic governments 
and societies try to suppress or ignore deeply felt needs and grievances, then peaceful 
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protests, agitation and passive civil disobedience are likely to give way, rapidly, to 
political violence."146     
It is in environments such as this where rebel organizations, which have to 
develop a dialogue of grievance in order to function, can flourish.  "Grievance is to a 
rebel organization what image is to a business."147  Injustice in Ecuador may be founded 
on a number of objective justifications, however intrusion and despoliation of ancestral 
lands is of the most immediate concern.  The indigenous organizations can easily 
indoctrinate the appearance of injustice nationally and internationally.  "Building a 
loathing of the enemy will bring with it a readiness to fight."148  As Collier has noted, 
"the leader of a rebel organization will offer a litany of grievances against the 
government, for its oppression, unfairness, and victimization of some part of the 
population."149  The other sectors of the populous that have been loosing out for the past 
20 years are only too ready to give their support to the indigenous.  These people, 
students, middle class, and teachers' are prone to believe the litany of injus tice that the 
Ecuadorian political and economic system makes plain to see.150 
Democracy not withstanding, ethno-political conflict has been the world's largest, 
frequent cause of fighting for a number of decades. 151   In these cases cultural 
characteristics are powerful and more permanent than nearly all other communal 
identities.  Cultural uniqueness is most liable to offer the foundation for political 
mobilization.   When it supplies the source for inequalities between ethnic groups in 
standing, economic well-being, and admittance to political power that are intentionally 
continued by means of public policy and social custom, then conflict may follow.  The 
combination of mutual injustice with a dedicated awareness of group distinctiveness and 
shared interest offers extremely unstable background that stimulates unplanned exploits 
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whenever the external regime weakens.  The arrangement stimulates influential political 
movements whenever it can be structured and prepared by group leaders who give 
credible illustration to national and minority peoples' complaints and objectives.152  
After two decades of democracy and liberal economics in Ecuador resulting in 
frustration, the indigenous people may feel justified in using violence to achieve a 
political objective.  Whether as perpetrator or blameless spectator, indigenous peoples 
have been intensely concerned with state efforts to manage illegal narcotics dealings.  
Currently, Ecuador serves as a transit zone for shipments to the U.S. and Europe.  This 
closeness to the situation is due to the habits of drug traffickers.  Customarily residing in 
the mountains and jungles of Ecuador, often along international boundaries, indigenous 
peoples coexist in territory with drug traffickers who desire protection and anonymity in 
these inaccessible locations.  They also share terrain with the national police and armed 
forces that guard and protect these borders, and who chase the drug traffickers and 
manufacturers who use them.  In the performance of their duties by Ecuadorian militaries 
and national police Indians may be mistaken for drug traffickers as policies are designed 
to produce results.  Inadvertently they also produce human rights violations against 
indigenous populations.153   
Ecuador is first in line to suffer the likely penalty of the U.S. backing of a military 
offensive against drug traffickers in southern Colombia.  The U.S. has presented Ecuador 
$20 million to cope with the spillover, but President Noboa requests a Plan Colombia for 
Ecuador to include large size U.S. financial assistance for economic development in 
northern Ecuador.  Ecuador's soils are appropriate for farming coca and opium poppy, 
and its impecunious northern region is perfect ground for a drug-fueled uprising.  High 
oil prices and implementing the U.S. dollar as Ecuador's state legal tender have steadied 
the economy and soothed political pressure, but oil prices will fall and the danger of 
renewed political turmoil is high. 154   
                                                 
152 Ibid, 63.   
153 Van Cott, Donna Lee, Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America. New York. St. 
 Martin's Press. 1994. 19. 
154 Stratfor.com's Global Intelligence Update, "Ecuador: Seeking the Benefits of a Plan Colombia, 24 
October 2000.   http://www.stratfor.com  Accessed 10/24/2000.   
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Plan Colombia need only be partially successful for a small percentage of coca 
cultivation to shift into Ecuador.  Non-indigenous spreaders could facilitate the spread of 
coca farming.  Indigenous participation in drugs need not be specialized in any one area.  
There are many functions that comprise the drug trade.   One job would be defending 
crops, laboratories, storage facilities, and airfields from government anti-narcotics 
operations.  Success means "tax" revenue from persons who profit from that security.  
Another facet would be to directly control cocaine paste and base manufacture and 
transactions.  A final aspect is to support drug traffickers with shipping and storage of 
cocaine and marijuana in Ecuador.155  Poor citizens living in squalor along the border 
would see an incentive to join the Colombian rebels with drug production and spread 
from there.  A few indigenous groups would take advantage of this in order to protect 
their lands from militarization and economic destruction.   
Collier argues that civil wars occur where rebel organizations are financially 
viable.  The FARC has developed an organization to engage around 12,000 fighters based 
on the approximately $700 million it receives from drugs and kidnapping.  Economic 
theory of conflict contends that the stimulus of conflict is inconsequential; what is of 
importance is whether the organization can maintain itself monetarily.  Tangible 
measures of shared injustice, such as inequality, a lack of democracy, and ethnic and 
religious divisions, have had no systematic consequence on risk.  It does not in actuality 
make a difference whether rebels are motivated by greed, by a lust for power, or by 
grievance, as long as the viability of predation on the government source of revenue 
while maintaining a secure source for the movement exists.156  
  Such economic characteristics as dependence on primary commodity exports, 
low average incomes, and slow growth all have considerable and prevailing ability to 
forecast civil war.  These circumstances facilitate the recruitment of personnel to the 
cause due to limited government resources.  Rebellions encompass the intention of 
natural resource avaricious, or are perilously reliant upon natural resource predation in 
order to follow other intentions.  While this may not hold true for Ecuadorian indigenous, 
                                                 
155 Serafino, Nina M., "Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options," CRS Report for Congress, 
Washington D.C., The Library of Congress, February 12, 2001. 
156 Collier, Paul. "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy, World Bank, 
2000, 4. 
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the government sill has the problem of protecting its oil infrastructure.  Pinpointing the 
location of insurgents is difficult and is why geography matters.  Since the indigenous 
populace is highly geographically dispersed, then the country becomes difficult for the 
government to manage than if everyone lived in the same small area.  In one section of 
the Amazon, the Oriente can be found 500,000 indigenous peoples. Other communities 
can be found scattered in other parts of the Amazon, Sierra and Coastal regions.  With 
geographic scattering Ecuador has a danger of conflict of approximately 50 percent 
whereas with Singapore- like concentration its possibility plunges to roughly 3 percent.157  
I have argued that Ecuador has historically excluded the indigenous peoples 
economically to the point where they exist at the lowest levels of poverty in the country.  
Historically the indigenous people have been tied to their land and current economic 
policies are endangering their communal property rights and their way of life.  Also 
contributing to that inequality is the political exclusion they experience.  Without 
effective representation, social programs may be cancelled at will and economic policies 
and reforms are implemented without debate with those they most affect.  With this last 
wave of democratization, the indigenous people are now highly organized.  They have 
changed their image from one of subservience to activists demanding the government 
uphold its constitutional mandate while increasing the indigenous peoples own rights to 
self-determination.  The combination of these three factors creates potential for further 
violence.  The governments pursuit of oil and its damaging effects on the economy and 
environment will clash with the indigenous peoples desire to maintain their culture and 
way of life.  The violence stemming from the insurgency and large flows of illegal money 
in neighboring countries only increases the likelihood of Indian political violence in 
Ecuador.  To avoid this crisis two items in the constitution must be upheld.  First, 
Ecuador must ensure oil producing regions are environmentally protected and action 
taken to correct damage done in the past.  Second, communities whose environment is 
affected must be included in the decision making process.  On the part of the U.S., greater 
effort must be made in accomplishing greater free trade with Ecuador and the region 
overall, and directing aid specifically toward rural development and agricultural 
efficiency among indigenous farmers.   
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